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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations
of otherwise unrelated products. I show that while umbrella branding can credibly signal
positive quality correlation, there are no equilibria in which umbrella branding either fully
certies high quality, or signals negative quality correlation. Finally, whenever umbrella
branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, rms that already produce high quality
products have stronger incentives to invest in developing further high quality products than
rms that are currently inactive or produce low quality products.
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1 Introduction
Umbrella branding is a widespread marketing practice that consists of selling di¤erent products
under the same brand name. Some umbrella brands sell closely related products, e.g., Dell
sells at screen televisions, at screen monitors and laptops. Others sell products in unrelated
categories, e.g. Virgin sells music disks, air travel, cola drinks and nancial services. Why
should a rm extend a brand, that is, introduce new products under an umbrella brand with
one or several existing products? One convincing explanation is that brand extensions allow
rms to leverage existing brand equity.1 The idea is that umbrella branding helps rms with
strong brands to successfully introduce new products by convincing consumers that new and
existing products are of similar quality. One implication is that if an umbrella branded product
does not satisfy consumers, then all other products sold under the same brand will likely su¤er.
Conversely, individual successes may benet several products.
The present paper analyzes these trade-o¤s in a model based on an information asymmetry
between rms and consumers. Each product is characterized by a quality level that is observable
only by rms. Product qualities are either exogeneously given, or determined upfront by the
rmsinvestment decisions in product development. Consumers observe product performances,
but these are (always) imperfect signals of quality. In this context, a products reputation at
any point in time is the belief consumers hold about its quality at that moment.
The correlation between the qualities of umbrella branded products is endogenous in my
analysis. In other words, even in the baseline version of the model with exogeneously given
quality levels, the qualities of the products a rm has the option to under the same brand need
not be uniform. Uniform quality could arise due to the use of a common input for example,
but in most instances it seems restrictive to rule out ex ante the possibility that a brand sells
products of di¤erent qualities. This is especially true for brands such as Virgin that span
across very dissimilar product categories. Moreover, products sold under the same brand are
often manufactured by di¤erent rms. The AT&T brand for example is licensed to VTech
for telephony products and to Verbatim for blank media. My model is general enough to be
interpreted in the context of brand licensing as well as in the context of brand extensions to
products developed by the brand owner itself. The essential element is that the branding decision
is taken so as to maximize the expected aggregate prots from selling the di¤erent products.
Since rms can condition their branding decisions on qualities, the absence of any exogenous
or technological correlation between qualities does not necessarily imply that umbrella branding
has no informational value for consumers. In general the decision to umbrella brand can induce
two di¤erent types of e¤ects. First, umbrella branding leads to feedback e¤ects whenever con-
1Classical marketing textbook references include Aaker and Keller (1990), Kapferer (1997), and Aaker (2004).
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sumers believe that the qualities of the di¤erent products are correlated. The performance of
each product then yields information not only about the products own quality, but also induces
consumers to update their beliefs about other products sold under the same umbrella brand. In
the case of positive correlation, the success (failure) of any one of the umbrella branded products
has a positive (negative) feedback e¤ect on the other products. Second, the umbrella branding
decision itself may inuence the prices consumers are willing to pay for the di¤erent products;
umbrella branding has signaling e¤ects in this case. I analyze these e¤ects in a two-stage game
with two products sold either under separate brands or under an umbrella brand in both periods.
One key result is that, for exogenously given quality levels, the relative importance of the
signaling and feedback e¤ects may be such that positive quality correlation arises endogenously
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In some situations there even exist equilibria in which umbrella
brands always o¤er products of uniform quality. In the equilibria with perfect positive correlation
characterized in the paper, the signaling e¤ects are such that rms of any quality prole could
make a short term gain by using an umbrella brand; the expected long term impact of the
branding decision, however, depends on actual qualities. For rms with one good and one bad
product, umbrella branding means putting the future reputation of the good product at stake
by inviting consumers to pool their experiences. If future prots are important, these rms
will therefore prefer separate branding. For rms with two bad products, on the other hand,
the branding decisions expected long term impact may be neglegible: if the consumption of
a bad product is su¢ ciently likely to convince consumers of the products low quality, then
bad products can be expected to lose their reputations in the long term independently of the
branding decision. Umbrella branding will then be attractive for rms with only bad products,
since it allows them to reap short term prot gains without incurring any signicant long term
losses. Finally, for rms with two good products, umbrella branding is attractive not only in
the short but also in the long term: thanks to feedback e¤ects, these rms expect to consolidate
their productsreputations faster under umbrella than under separate branding.
In contrast, there are no counterintuitive equilibria in which successes (failures) have negative
(positive) feedback e¤ects. If consumers expected the qualities of umbrella branded products to
be negatively correlated, then rms with two bad products would benet from positive feedback
e¤ects with a higher likelihood than rms with one or two good products. Moreover, the outside
option of separate branding is always less protable for rms with two bad products than for
any other rm. These arguments imply that umbrella branding would be particularly attractive
for rms with only bad products. Anticipating this, however, consumerswillingness to pay
for umbrella branded products would be low. This in turn would render umbrella branding
unprotable for all rms.
Extending the baseline model where all quality levels are exogenous, I also consider a situ-
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ation where producers of new goods choose their productsqualities prior to selling. Choosing
high quality is associated with a xed investment cost, privately drawn by each producer from
a commonly known probability distribution. In this framework, equilibria in which umbrella
branding signals perfect quality correlation continue to exist, and all share the following feature.
Investing in the new products quality is more attractive for rms with a good existing product,
available for an umbrella brand, than for mono-product rms: selling good new product is more
protable if you can umbrella brand it with a good existing product and thereby benet (in
expectation) from positive feedback e¤ects in both directions. Finally, rms that already sell
a product of low quality have the lowest investment incentive. For rms that already own a
brand, the option to use an umbrella brand thus renders aligning the new products quality to
that of the existing product more attractive.
Finally, I identify a number of necessary conditions for the existence of informative equi-
libria.2 First, the markets for the di¤erent products must be su¢ ciently symmetric. Second,
there must be repeated consumption of both products, and rms must be su¢ ciently patient.
Third, consumersinformation about product qualities must be limited at the moment the brand
extension occurs. Fourth, potential quality di¤erences must be important. These conditions are
necessary to ensure that signaling and feedback e¤ects on both products play a signicant role
in the branding decision, which is needed to "separate" rms with di¤erent quality proles.
These results are in line with the empirical and experimental evidence.3 In particular, many
studies conrm that umbrella brands induce a positive correlation between quality perceptions
without certifying high quality; moreover, many case studies document feedback and signaling
e¤ects of the signs predicted here. Concerning the structural conditions necessary for credible
signaling, my analysis leads to several testable predictions.
Related Literature4 There are two main approaches to model umbrella branding, and more
generally reputation, in the economics literature. Either reputation refers to a rms or a
products characteristics (adverse selection), or to its actions (moral hazard).5 Brand names are
important in this context as carriers of information.6
2As is standard in signaling games, there always exist uninformative (babbling) equilibria in which umbrella
branding occurs but has no impact on beliefs or prices.
3Section 6.2 discusses the empirical evidence in more detail; the main references in that section are Aaker and
Keller (1990), Sullivan (1990), Smith and Park (1992) and Erdem (1998).
4Section 7.1 provides a more detailed comparison between this analysis and alternative theories.
5Seminal articles on the adverse selection approach to reputation are Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps
and Wilson (1982). The basic framework of the moral hazard approach goes back to Klein and Le­ er (1981),
and Shapiro (1983). Mailath and Samuelson (2006) as well as Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) present a variety of
recent reputation models, some of which combine aspects of moral hazard and adverse selection.
6Name trading between rms has been modelled by Kreps (1990) in a moral hazard context, and by Tadelis
(1999) in an adverse selection model that shares some features with my approach.
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Existing theoretical analyses of umbrella branding focus on umbrella branding as a way to
signal high quality. Wernerfelt (1988) considers a simple adverse selection model in which the
quality correlation between umbrella branded products is endogenous. He establishes conditions
for an equilibrium in which umbrella branding fully certies the high quality of both products.
This situation is sustained by pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs following failures of umbrella
branded products, which under some additional conditions are the only beliefs satisfying the
intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). These results hinge upon the assumptions that (i)
good products never fail, and (ii) umbrella branding is more costly than the introduction of a
new brand.
Choi (1998) derives a similar quality certication result in a moral hazard context.7 In an
innite horizon model where a rm discovers a new product of given quality in every period,
he nds conditions for an equilibrium in which "premium" umbrella brands only extend to high
quality goods. This equilibrium is sustained by the threat of a complete breakdown of trust if
consumers ever observe that a bad product was introduced under a premium brand.
This paper uses a nite horizon approach to avoid problems common to repeated-game
models of reputation, in particular the high required degree of coordination between rms and
consumers, and the absence of any predictions concerning the evolution of reputation over time.
Moreover, in contrast to Wernerfelt (1988), the analysis does not rely on the assumptions that
umbrella branding is costly and that failures are perfect signals of low quality. The modeling
approach adopted in this paper leads to an important shift of focus in terms of results: while
umbrella brands are guarantees of high quality in the literature described so far, I stress the
role of umbrella brands as signals of quality correlation. As already mentioned, this is more
consistent with the empirical and experimental evidence (in particular, Aaker and Keller (1990)
and Erdem (1998)), which suggests that umbrella brands induce a positive correlation between
quality perceptions without certifying high quality. Moreover, the present model permits a more
complete understanding of the costs and benets associated with umbrella branding for rms
with di¤erent quality proles.
Cabral (2000) analyzes an adverse selection model of umbrella branding in which quality
correlation is exogenous. The main di¤erence with respect to my model is thus that Cabral
assumes that all the products a rm has the option to sell under an umbrella brand must be
of the same quality. The purpose of umbrella branding is then to communicate to consumers
that di¤erent products are manufactured by the same rm. Allowing for a continuum of quality
levels, Cabrals main prediction is that umbrella branding signals high quality to consumers.
The intuition is that for high quality rms umbrella branding will lead to a positive feedback
7 In fact, his models features both adverse selection and moral hazard aspects; the branding problem itself,
however, is subject to a moral hazard problem.
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e¤ect with a higher likelihood than for low quality rms.
The analysis in this paper is complementary to that of Cabral. The novel result is that quality
correlation may arise endogenously, in which case even rms with only low quality products
sometimes use umbrella brands. My ndings are nonetheless consistent with Cabrals prediction
that umbrella branding signals high quality: umbrella branding has a positive signaling e¤ect
on at least one of the products and increases aggregate short-term prots in the equilibria with
positive quality correlation characterized in this paper.
Finally, my analysis provides a new angle on the impact of umbrella branding on quality
provision. The existing literature show that umbrella branding can increase the scope for quality
provision. Hakenes and Peitz (2008) nd this in a nite horizon model where quality investments
occur upfront as here, while Andersson (2002) and Cabral (2008) analyze innitely repeated
games where rms set qualities in every period. The mechanism that plays a crucial rule in
these papers is that umbrella branding allows consumers to make inference on the basis of two
performance observations and hence punish the brand even if only one product fails.8 In a
framework where the core products quality is given by past decisions, I stress instead that rms
may have strong incentives to align the new products quality to that of their core product.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework. Section 3 presents
the main e¤ects of umbrella branding on beliefs and prots; in particular, it explains the rela-
tionship between the branding strategy, the correlation of consumersprior quality perceptions,
and signaling and feedback e¤ects. Section 4 briey discusses equilibria without feedback e¤ects.
Section 5 discusses equilibria with feedback e¤ects. Section 6 extends the basic model by endoge-
nizing the quality of new products. Section 7 rst discusses di¤erences with alternative theories,
and then links the main ndings to the empirical evidence. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Framework
There are two experience goods, each either of good or of bad quality. A good product is
successful, i.e. works well, with probability g 2 (0; 1), while a bad product is successful with
probability b 2 (0; g). In each period of the multi-stage game with repeated consumption that
will be analyzed, the performance of each product is realized anew. The productsqualities are
constant over time.
At time t = 0, an innovator discovers a new9 product of quality qn 2 fb; gg. The innovator
8 In Andersson (2002) and Cabral (2008), the basic mechanism ressembles that in Bernheim and Whinston
(1990)s analysis of collusion under multimarket contact. Hakenes and Peitz (2008), using the assumption that
high quality products never fail, rely on out-of-equilibrium beliefs following the failure of one or both umbrella
branded products.
9 In the baseline model described here, the terms "old" and "new" are used for illustration only. In section 6,
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always has the option to (costlessly) launch a new brand to sell this product. With some
exogenous probability  2 (0; 1), however, the innovator also "meets" an incumbent with an old
product of quality qo 2 fb; gg. Both the innovator and the incumbent observe qo and qn. If the
rms meet, then they can decide to sign a brand licensing agreement. In that case, the new
product will be sold under an umbrella brand with the incumbents old product, that is, the
incumbent will extend its brand to the new product. I do not explicitly model the negotiation
between the innovator and the incumbent, but simply assume that it is e¢ cient, i.e. the parties
take the umbrella branding decision so as to maximize the (expected) aggregate prots made
from selling the two products. I denote by xqoqn 2 [0; 1] the probability that the old product of
quality qo and the new product of quality qn are sold under an umbrella brand, conditional on
the incumbent and the innovator having met. An umbrella branding strategy is hence a vector
(xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb) that gives the probability of a brand extension for every possible quality prole
(qo; qn).
At time t = 1, consumers rst observe brand names, and then take consumption decisions.
After consumption all consumers observe the performances o 2 fF; Sg and n 2 fF; Sg, where
F stands for failure and S for success, of the old and the new product, respectively. Product
performances are public information and distributed i.i.d. across periods. At time t = 2, the
rms sell both products again. The following table summarizes the timing of events:
Timing:
t = 0 Innovator discovers new product of quality qn.
If the innovator "meets" the incumbent with a product of quality qo,
the new product will carry the same name as the old product with probability xqoqn .
t = 1 Consumers observe brand names, and then buy both products.
Consumers observe the performances o and n.
t = 2 Consumers buy both products again.
The prior reputations of the two products at t = 0 are parameters of the model and denoted
by  2 (0; 1) for the new product and by r 2 (0; 1) for the old product. Ex ante consumers hence
assign probability  to the event that the new product is good and r to the event that the old
product is good. In each period, consumers then update their beliefs, i.e. the probabilities they
assign to di¤erent realizations of (qo; qn), as a function of the information they possess. At the
beginning of period 1, the consumersinformation set simply includes the observation of whether
the products are sold under an umbrella brand or not. After rst period consumption has taken
however, the new and only the new products quality will be endogenous.
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place, consumers receive two additional pieces of information, namely the performances o and
n.
To simplify, I will focus on the limit case where , the probability of a "match" between
the innovator and the incumbent, goes to zero. Having the opportunity to umbrella brand is
then a measure zero event. The key implication is that if consumers observe separate brands
rather than an umbrella brand, then they will not draw any inferences about qualities from this
observation. Hence, the absence of a brand extension does not lead consumers to revise their
prior beliefs  and r.10 The remark at the end of this section briey summarizes an overlapping
generations model with a continuum of rms that shares this feature.
For all consumers, the consumption of a well functioning product procures a utility of one
while consumption of a failing product procures no utility. A consumers willingness to pay for
a product with reputation  is thus
w()  g + (1  )b:
In every period the rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to consumers, and therefore optimally
set each products price equal to consumerswillingness to pay for that product.11
The production costs of both products are zero. The markets for the di¤erent products
can be asymmetric however, i.e. rms may attach di¤erent weights to di¤erent products at
di¤erent times. I denote the share of the market for the new product in total sales by  2 (0; 1).
Moreover, the weight attached to second period prots is denoted by  2 (0; 1). Normalizing the
total number of units sold (of the two products in the two periods) to one, consumers then buy
(1  )(1  ) units of the old product in period 1, (1  ) units of the new product in period
1, (1  ) units of the old product in period 2, and  units of the new product in period 2.
Attention will be restricted to equilibria in which umbrella branding indeed occurs with
positive probability, i.e. xqo;qn > 0 for some (qo; qn), which implies that there will be no need to
deal with out-of-equilibrium beliefs. I will hence use the concept of Bayesian equilibrium:
Denition 1 A (Bayesian) equilibrium consists of a belief system and an umbrella branding
10 If  > 0, then the beliefs assigned to mono-product brands would have to take into account the possibility
that a sellers was matched but decided in favor of separate brands. For example, under separate branding the
rst period reputation of an old product would be
(1  )r +  [r(1  xgg) + r(1  )(1  xgb)]
(1  ) +  [r(1  xgg) + r(1  )(1  xgb) + (1  r)(1  xbg) + (1  r)(1  )(1  xbb)] :
instead of simply r. Since all beliefs (and hence prots) are continuous in  at  = 0, however, all results in this
paper would continue to hold for strictly positive but small .
11Tadelis (1999) uses a similar simplication in his model of name trading with a continuum of rms and
consumers by supposing that consumers are on the long side of the market. Cabral (2000) as well as Hakenes and
Peitz (2004) use the same assumptions in the context of umbrella branding.
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strategy (xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb) such that (i) the branding strategy maximizes aggregate prots given
beliefs, and (ii) beliefs are Bayesian consistent given the branding strategy.
Remark It is easy to reinterpret this model without referring to any outside innovator.
Consider an economy with overlapping generations of rms that live for at least three periods.
In each period, there is a continuum of incumbent sellers and a continuum of new entrants.
Each rm produces one product that it sells under the same brand name in every period of
its lifetime. In addition, one randomly chosen incumbent with two more periods left to live
discovers a new product. This rm can then either extend its existing brand to the new product
or introduce a new brand. Since there is a continuum of rms with two more periods to live,
a brand extension is a measure zero event, and the observation that a brand is not extended
has no relevant informational content for consumers. Similarly, consumers cannot distinguish
between unknown brands of entrants and unknown brands of incumbents. Cabral (2000) uses a
similar set-up.
3 Signaling and Feedback E¤ects
3.1 The Impact of Umbrella Branding on Beliefs
Umbrella branding may induce two types of e¤ects on the consumersbeliefs. First, the decision
to umbrella brand by itself may serve as a quality signal. For the new product, for example, such
a signaling e¤ect occurs whenever consumers believe that a new product introduced under an
established brand is either more or less likely to be of high quality than new products carrying
unknown brand names. These signaling e¤ects are relevant both for rst and second period
beliefs.
Second, umbrella branding may lead to feedback e¤ects if consumers believe that the qualities
of the umbrella branded products are correlated. The success or failure of one product, say the
new product, then induced consumers to revise their beliefs not only about the new product
itself but also about the old product. Since these feedback e¤ects are linked to performance
observations that rst occur at the end of period one, feedback e¤ects are only relevant for the
analysis of second period beliefs.
Period 1 To analyze the short term signaling e¤ects of umbrella branding, I compare con-
sumersbeliefs at the beginning of the rst period under umbrella branding and under separate
branding. Since a match between the incumbent and the outside innovator is a measure zero
event, consumers confronted with two separate brands do not revise their priors r and .
Confronted with an umbrella brand instead, consumers possibly revise their beliefs about
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both productsqualities. Whenever brand extensions happen with positive probability in equi-
librium, all beliefs can be obtained by Bayesian updating. I denote by qoqn the probability
consumers assign to the quality prole (qo; qn) if they observe an umbrella brand; for example:12
gg =
rxgg
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb :
To simplify notations, I will denote the aggregate belief that the old product of the umbrella
brand is good by
o = gg + gb;
and the belief that the new product is good by
n = gg + bg:
Umbrella branding then has a positive signaling e¤ect on the new product if and only if it
improves the consumersbelief about the quality of the new product, i.e. whenever
n > :
This condition is satised whenever, given the prior r about the quality of the old product, a
brand extension is more likely to involve a good rather than a bad new product:
rxgg + (1  r)xbg > rxgb + (1  r)xbb:
Similarly, the signaling e¤ect on the core product is positive if and only if
o > r;
which is equivalent to
xgg + (1  )xgb > xbg + (1  )xbb:
Period 2 After rst period consumption, consumers observe the performances of both
products. They then update their beliefs so as to take into account these additional pieces of
information in the second period.
Under separate branding, the updating of beliefs is "standard" in the sense that consumers
only take into account each products own performance. If the old product succeeds in the rst
12The probabilities consumers assign to the quality proles other than (g; g) are
gb =
r(1  )xgb
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb ;
bg =
(1  r)xbg
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb ; and
bb =
(1  r)(1  )xbb
rxgg + r(1  )xgb + (1  r)xbg + (1  r)(1  )xbb :
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period, for example, consumers update their belief that the old product is of high quality from
r to
S(r)  rg
rg + (1  r)b .
Similarly, if the new product fails, consumers revise their belief that it is of high quality from 
to
F ()  (1  g)
(1  g) + (1  )(1  b) .
The updated belief after a failure of the old product is then F (r), and the updated belief
following a success of the new product is S().
Under umbrella branding, consumers update their rst period beliefs o and n not only
taking into account each products own performance, but possibly also the brands overall per-
formance. Consider consumersbelief about the old product after a success of this product for
example. If consumers ignored the new products performance, then their second period belief
would simply be S(o). Now suppose that the new product was successful, too, and that con-
sumers indeed use this additional information. In that case, the belief consumers hold about
the old product "before" taking account of the old products own performance, is no longer o
but instead
oS =
ggg + gbb 
gg + bg

g + (gb + bb)b
.
The "nal" belief consumers assign to the core product being good if both products were suc-
cessful in the rst period is then simply
S(
o
S) =
ggg
2 + gbgb
ggg
2 + gbgb+ bgbg + bbb
2
:
The success of the new product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the old product if and only if
oS > 
o.
The beliefs consumers hold about the quality of the new product, or after observing di¤erent
performance outcomes, can be obtained using the same hypothetical two-step procedure. First,
the observation of product  is performance  i has a feedback e¤ect on the belief about product
is quality (i 6=  i), captured by the revision from i to i i .13 Second, consumers update their
13 In the cases ignored so far, the beliefs after the rst step of the revision are
oF =
gg(1  g) + gb(1  b) 
gg + bg

(1  g) + (gb + bb)(1  b)
;
nS =
ggg + bgb 
gg + gb

g + (bg + bb)b
; and
nF =
gg(1  g) + bg(1  b) 
gg + gb

(1  g) + (bg + bb)(1  b)
:
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belief to take into account product is own performance i, which amounts to a revision from i i
to i(
i
 i). The following table summarizes second period beliefs as a function of the pieces
of information (umbrella versus separate branding, and the productsperformances) consumers
have:
S of old, S of new S of old, F of new F of old, S of new F of old, F of new
umbrella brand S(
o
S); S(
n
S) S(
o
F ); F (
n
S) F (
o
S); S(
n
F ) F (
o
F ); F (
n
F )
separate brands S(r); S() S(r); F () F (r); S() F (r); F ()
After any realization of performances, the e¤ect of umbrella branding on the second period
belief about each product can then be decomposed into two e¤ects. Following two successes, for
example, the impact of umbrella branding on the old products reputation is
S(
o
S)  S(r) = [S(oS)  S(o)] + [S(o)  S(r)] :
The rst term between brackets is positive if and only if the success of the new product has a
positive feedback e¤ect on the old product. The second term is positive if and only if umbrella
branding has a positive signaling e¤ect on the old product.
Quality Correlation and Feedback E¤ects Calculating the correlation coe¢ cient be-
tween the (prior) quality perceptions of umbrella branded products yields
 =
ggbb   gbbgq
(gg + gb)  (gg + gb)2
q
(gg + bg)  (gg + bg)2
: (1)
This correlation is positive if and only if
ggbb > gbbg:
Relying on this simply condition, it is straightforward to check that for any i 2 fo; ng,
iS > 
i > iF if and only if  > 0,
iS = 
i = iF if and only if  = 0;
iS < 
i < iF if and only if  < 0:
(2)
If consumers believe that the qualities of umbrella branded products are positively correlated
( > 0), then successes have positive feedback e¤ects. Conversely, if  < 0, then the success of
any one of the products has a negative feedback e¤ect on the other products reputation. For
 = 0, there are no feedback e¤ects at all.
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3.2 The Impact of Umbrella Branding on Prots
Given beliefs, one can analyze the rmsincentive to use an umbrella brand by considering the
marginal impact of umbrella branding on the expected aggregate prots. I denote by 1 the
di¤erence between the rst period prots under umbrella branding and under separate branding:
1 = (1  ) [w(o)  w(r)] +  [w(n)  w()] :
Similarly, 2(o; n) denotes the (ex post) di¤erence in second period prots between umbrella
and separate branding, following the performance prole (o; n):
2(o; n) = (1  )

w
 
o(
o
n)
  w (o(r))+  w  n(no)  w (n()) :
For example,
2(S; F ) = (1  ) [w (S(oF ))  w (S(r))] +  [w (F (nS))  w (F ())] :
Finally, (qo; qn) denotes the total di¤erence in expected prots between umbrella and sepa-
rate branding, which is equal to the weighted sum of the rst period and expected second period
prot di¤erences:
(qo; qn) = (1  )1 + E[2(o; n) j qo; qn]; (3)
where
E[2(o; n) j qo; qn] = qoqn2(S; S) + qo(1  qn)2(S; F )
+(1  qo)qn2(F; S) + (1  qo)(1  qn)2(F; F ):
The branding strategy (xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb) is optimal, i.e. maximizes aggregate prots, if and
only if for all (qo; qn),
xqoqn =
8>><>>:
1 if (qo; qn) > 0;
any " 2 [0; 1] if (qo; qn) = 0;
0 if (qo; qn) < 0:
(4)
The Umbrella Branding Strategy and Quality Correlation Let me now link the
branding strategy to the correlation of consumersquality perceptions. It is easy to check that
 > 0 if and only if xggxbb > xgbxbg: (5)
Note also that perfect positive correlation (i.e.  = 1) obtains for any branding strategy such
that xgb = xbg = 0 but xgg; xbb > 0. Perfect negative correlation (i.e.  =  1), on the other
hand, obtains for any branding strategy such that umbrella branding always involves products
of opposite qualities, i.e. if xgg = xbb = 0 but xgb; xbg > 0.
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The Prot Impact of Signaling and Feedback E¤ects To illustrate the impact of the
signaling and feedback e¤ects on prots, note rst that in
1 = (1  ) [w(o)  w(r)]| {z }
short run price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product
+ [w(n)  w()]| {z }
short run price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new product
;
the rst term is positive if and only if the signaling e¤ect on the core product is positive, and
the second term is positive if and only if the signaling e¤ect on the extension product is positive.
The expected second period prot di¤erence can be decomposed as follows:
E[2(o; n) j qo; qn] =
(1  ) E w  o(on)  w (o(o)) j qo; qn| {z }
expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on the old product
+(1  ) E [w (o(o))  w (o(r)) j qo]| {z }
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product
+ E

w
 
n(
n
o)
  w (n(n)) j qo; qn| {z }
expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on the new product
+ E [w (n(
n))  w (n()) j qn]| {z }
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new product
Since S () and F () are both increasing, the "expected long term price impact of the signaling
e¤ect on the old product" is positive if and only if o > r. Similarly, for the new product, the
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect is positive if and only if n > . The
signs of these e¤ects are hence independent of the concerned productsquality; their magnitudes,
however, generally vary with quality.
As already explained in the section on beliefs, given the sign of the correlation coe¢ cient ,
it is easy to assess the signs of the two feedback e¤ects ex post. For  > 0, for example, a success
of the extension product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the (price of the) core product. The
following lemma shows that knowledge of the quality of product  i is su¢ cient to also assess
the "expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i":
Lemma 1  For  > 0, the expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i 2 fo; ng
is positive if and only if product  i 6= i is good. Formally, for any qo 2 fb; gg :
E

w
 
o(
o
n)
  w (o(o)) j qo; qn > 0 if and only if qn = g;
and for any qn 2 fb; gg:
E

w
 
n(
n
o)
  w (n(n)) j qo; qn > 0 if and only if qo = g:
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 For  < 0, the expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i 2 fo; ng is
positive if and only if product  i 6= i is bad.
In some instances, lemma 1 will prove helpful in evaluating the total impact of umbrella
branding on prots: the lemma implies for example that if (i)  > 0 and (ii) both signaling
e¤ects are non-negative, then (gg) > 0.
4 Equilibria without Feedback E¤ects
There are potentially two kinds of equilibria without feedback e¤ects (i.e. such that  = 0):
babblingequilibria in which umbrella branding does not a¤ect prices at all, and equilibria in
which it allows consumers to fully infer the quality of (at least) one of the products. In the latter
case, since consumers never revise their belief about one of the products after the beginning of
the rst period, performances cannot induce any feedback e¤ects (in either direction).
BabblingEquilibria
Proposition 1 There always exist babbling equilibria in which umbrella branding occurs but
has no e¤ect on beliefs.
Moreover, only babbling equilibria exist if - ceteris paribus - one of the following conditions
is satised:
1. The markets for the old and for the new product are too asymmetric, i.e.  is too close to
0 or to 1:
2. The consumersprior about one of the products is already very accurate, i.e. r is too close
to 1 or to 0, or  is too close to 1 or to 0.
3. Firms are too impatient, i.e.  is too close to 0.
4. Quality di¤erences are too small, i.e. b is too close to g.
The existence of babbling equilibria is standard in signaling games. If, for example, the rms
choose an umbrella brand whenever the opportunity arises, then brands reveal no information
about qualities. This in turn implies that the rms are indeed indi¤erent to the choice between
umbrella branding and separate branding.
Moreover, for umbrella branding to credibly a¤ect beliefs and thus be more than just bab-
bling, rms with products of di¤erent qualities must have di¤erent incentives to inuence beliefs.
This requires that prots are su¢ ciently responsive to the performances of both products. A
prerequisite for this is of course that beliefs are su¢ ciently responsive to performances.
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It is easy to see why this cannot be true in the last two situations treated in the proposition.
For b too close to g, beliefs hardly respond to performance observations. If  is too close to 0, on
the other hand, then intertemporal prots are not at all responsive to performances, as future
prots do not receive any weight.
If consumers are already very well-informed about the quality of one of the products (situa-
tion 2.), then (i) umbrella branding cannot a¤ect the price of that product in either the short or
the long run, and (ii) beliefs almost do not respond to that products performance. This means
that the signaling e¤ect on the other product will drive the branding decision. Since the sign of
that e¤ect is the same for all quality proles, however, there is no way to induce certain types to
umbrella brand with a higher probability than other types, which would be necessary to create
such a signaling e¤ect in the rst place.
Finally, if markets are very asymmetric, then branding decisions almost exclusively depend
on the prot impact on one single product. Suppose for example that the market for the
extension product is very small compared to that for the core product. Then, the performance
of the extension product mainly matters because of its feedback e¤ect on the core product. The
core products performance, on the other hand, is mainly important with respect to its impact
on the size of the signaling e¤ect on the core product. Performances thus have two instead of
four relevant e¤ects on prots, which, as shown in the proof of proposition 1, does not su¢ ce to
sustain a non-babbling equilibrium.
Hence, for non-babbling equilibria to exist, it is necessary that (i) rms su¢ ciently care
about the prots made from selling both the old and the new product, as well as about future
prots, (ii) consumers are relatively ill-informed about both productsqualities at the moment
of the brand extension, and (iii) potential quality di¤erences are signicant.
Equilibria with Full Revelation
Proposition 2 There does not exist any equilibrium in which umbrella branding fully reveals
the high quality of the old and/or the new product.
Firms would clearly like consumers to believe that both products are of high quality. How-
ever, even rms with one or several bad products want consumers to hold such beliefs, and
the certication provided by umbrella branding would actually be more valuable for such rms
than for those with good products: since under separate branding consumers are more likely to
revise their beliefs downwards when products are bad rather than good, the "outside option" of
separate branding is less attractive the higher the number of bad products. As a result, there
cannot be any equilibrium such that only good products are sold under umbrella brands. By
the same reasoning, umbrella branding cannot be used to certify the quality of only one of the
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products on o¤er. Note that this result relies on the fact that performances are always imperfect
signals of qualities. Consumers who are completely convinced that a product is good therefore
do not revise their beliefs downwards even after observing a failure.
For the sake of completeness, note that there may exist non-babbling equilibria without
feedback e¤ects in which the decision to umbrella brand reveals the bad quality of one product
while signaling that the other product is good with a high probability:
Proposition 3 There may exist mixed strategy equilibria such that  = 0 but umbrella brand-
ing a¤ects beliefs. Any such equilibrium must be of the form xgg = 0, min[xgb; xbg] = 0,
max[xgb; xbg] > 0, and xbb 2 (0;max[xgb; xbg]).
5 Equilibria with Feedback E¤ects
There are two kinds of equilibria with feedback e¤ects. First, equilibria with positive quality
correlation (i.e. such that  > 0) in which the success (failure) of any one of the products
has a positive (negative) feedback e¤ect on the other product. Second, equilibria with negative
correlation (i.e. such that  < 0) in which failures (successes) have positive (negative) feedback
e¤ects. In this section, I rst discuss some general characteristics of equilibria with positive
quality correlation, and then show that equilibria with perfect quality correlation exist in some
situations. Next, it is shown that there are no equilibria with negative quality correlation.
5.1 Equilibria with Positive Quality Correlation
5.1.1 General Discussion
In any equilibrium with positive quality correlation, i.e. such that  > 0, umbrella branding must
be protable for rms with products of uniform quality. Hence, the following two conditions
must be met:
(g; g)  0; and (b; b)  0: (6)
Intuitively, the condition (g; g)  0 is easy to satisfy. If  > 0 in equilibrium, then feedback
e¤ects have a positive expected long term impact for rms with only good products (see lemma
1). Hence, as long as signaling e¤ects are not "too" adverse, umbrella branding is protable for
rms with two good products.
It seems more di¢ cult to induce rms with two bad products to umbrella brand, since the
expected total impact of the feedback e¤ects is negative in that case. For umbrella branding
to be attractive nonetheless, its signaling e¤ect on at least one of the products must therefore
be positive. Thus, in any equilibrium such that  > 0, umbrella branding must have a positive
signaling e¤ect on the core product and/or the extension product.
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For positive quality correlation to arise, it is also necessary that (at least some) rms with
products of di¤ering qualities do not have any strict incentive to use umbrella brands, i.e. that
(g; b)  0; or/and (b; g)  0: (7)
Intuitively, it seems di¢ cult to reconcile any one of these conditions with (b; b)  0: failures
have negative feedback e¤ects here, and failures are most likely when both products are bad. To
explain why rms with products of di¤ering qualities may nevertheless have lower incentives to
use umbrella brands than rms with only bad products, one needs to consider the sizes of these
expected negative feedback e¤ects. To x ideas, let me focus on candidate equilibria in which
xgb < 1, which requires that (g; b)  0. In any such equilibrium, it must be that
(b; b)  (g; b): (8)
This condition is equivalent to
E [2(o; n) j b; b]  E [2(o; n) j g; b] ;
or
bE [2(S; n) j qn = b] + (1  b)E [2(F; n) j qn = b]
 gE [2(S; n) j qn = b] + (1  g)E [2(F; n) j qn = b] :
Clearly, the latter condition holds if and only if
E [2(F; n) j qn = b]  E [2(S; n) j qn = b] . (9)
Hence, given the new product is bad, umbrella branding must be less attractive in comparison
to separate branding if the old succeeds than if it fails. How is this possible, given that a success
of the old product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the new product under umbrella branding?14
If qn = b, then the new product is likely to fail, which induces a negative feedback e¤ect under
umbrella branding. The key point is that this negative feedback e¤ect from the new on the old
product may be stronger if the old product succeeds than if it fails. If the old products failure
already gives consumers a strong indication of low quality, then the new products failure just
provides some additional evidence pointing into the same direction. If the old product succeeds,
however, then the negative feedback e¤ect may severely damage the old products reputation.
Intuitively, this can be the case if consumers expect a strong quality correlation and a failures
are very strong indications of low quality, while successes leave open the possibility that the
product is bad. Separate branding may then be attractive for mixed quality rms because it
allows them to "protect" the reputation of the good product.
14Any success (failure) also has a positive (negative) direct e¤ect on the product concerned itself. The branding
decision can have an impact on the size, but not the sign, of this e¤ect. My discussion in the main text focuses
on feedback e¤ects instead, since these are key to understanding endogenous quality correlation.
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5.1.2 Pure Strategy Equilibria with Perfect Quality Correlation
The following proposition shows that for g su¢ ciently close to 1, there always exists a non-empty
set of values of the other parameters such that in equilibrium umbrella branding signals that
products are of uniform quality:
Proposition 4 There exist thresholds b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1), (r; ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and (r; ; ; b) 2
((); 1) such that for g su¢ ciently close to 1 a pure strategy equilibrium with  = 1 exists if
i) the parameters r,  and  are such that, given the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1), the decision
to umbrella brand increases short term prots:
1 > 0
$
r
r + (1  r)(1  ) > (1  )r + :
ii) quality di¤erences are su¢ ciently large:
b 2  0; b(r; ; ) ; and
iii) rms care both about present and future prots:
(r; ; ; b) <  < (r; ; ; b):
The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that consumers indeed believe that
umbrella brands sell products of uniform quality. Then, umbrella branding is a risky decision
for an incumbent-innovator pair with one good and one bad product. In the likely scenario
that the good product succeeds and the bad product fails, the failure of the bad product has a
negative feedback e¤ect on the good product. If failure is a strong indication of bad quality (i.e.
if g is close to 1), then this negative e¤ect dominates the positive feedback e¤ect arising from
the good products success. In the limit, for g equal to 1, consumers will always conclude that
both products are bad. Under separate branding, on the other hand, a failure only destroys the
reputation of the failing product itself, not that of the other product. Therefore, 2(F; S) and
2(S; F ) are negative for large enough g.
If both products are bad, on the other hand, two failures are (relatively) more likely. For
su¢ ciently large g, two failures (almost fully) convince consumers that both products are of bad
quality, both under umbrella and under separate branding. Indeed, as g approaches 1, the ex
post prot di¤erence completely vanishes: limg!12(F; F ) = 0. Hence, there is not much to
lose in the long run for rms with two bad products. The driving force behind the branding
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incentives of a (b; b)-type will then be signaling e¤ects. In particular, if 1 is su¢ ciently large,
the (b; b)-type will want to umbrella brand to exploit short-term prot opportunities, in spite
of possible negative feedback e¤ects in the future. In other words, if both products are bad
but the prior beliefs r and  are high enough so that 1 > 0,15 then it is optimal to umbrella
brand to maximally exploit the existing reputation in the short run. Firms with products of
di¤erent qualities, on the other hand, are more willing to forego short term prot gains in order
to preserve and continue building the good reputation of one of their products.
The condition that g is close to 1 ensure that failures are su¢ ciently strong indications
of low quality. The remaining three conditions in proposition 4 then play the following roles.
Condition ii) ensures that bad products are su¢ ciently likely to fail. Hence, rms with products
of di¤ering qualities are indeed very likely to experience one success and one failure, and lose
prots in the long term by opting for an umbrella brand. For rms with two bad products, on
the other hand, two failures are su¢ ciently more likely, so that the long term e¤ect of umbrella
branding is negligible. Condition i) guarantees that 1 > 0, so that for su¢ ciently low discount
factors, umbrella branding is nonetheless protable for rms with two bad products. However,
for too low discount factors, umbrella branding would also be protable for rms with products
of di¤ering qualities; condition iii) is therefore needed to ensure that the discount factor lies in
an intermediate range.
Finally, for rms with two good products, umbrella branding is very protable. For g close
to 1, two successes are almost certain for these rms. Hence, umbrella branding not only leads
to a short term gain, but also allows rms with two good products to consolidate the reputations
of their products faster than otherwise.
Numerical Example Figure 1 illustrates equilibria with perfect quality correlation. Figure
1a) shows for which values of r and b perfect correlation equilibria exist if g is almost equal to 1
(g = 0:99999999999999),  = 0:4, and the di¤erent markets are symmetric, i.e.  = 12 and  =
1
2 .
In this gure, umbrella branding is protable for the (qo; qn)-type if and only if r lies above the
indi¤erence curve along which (qo; qn) = 0. Moreover, umbrella branding increases prots in
the rst period if and only if r lies above the threshold r(0:4; 0:5) = 0:6 for which 1 = 0.16 I
can observe rst that for any r > 0:6, it is indeed optimal for the (g; g)-type to umbrella brand.
This is intuitive. For g close to 1, two successes in the rst period are almost certain if both
products are good, and successes have positive feedback e¤ects under umbrella branding. As
long as signaling e¤ects are not too negative, umbrella branding is therefore protable.
Consider the indi¤erence curve dened by (b; b) = 0 now. If bad products are likely to fail,
15 It can be shown that 1 > 0 here if, given  and , the prior r is su¢ ciently high.
16 In fact, whenever  = 1
2
, the strategy is pure and such that  > 0, then 1 > 0 if and only if r > 1  .
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i.e. b is small, then the (b; b)-type is likely to experience two failures. Since limg!12(F; F ) = 0,
umbrella branding is then protable for rms with two bad products whenever 1 > 0. As
b rises, it becomes more probable that one product will fail and one succeed, which renders
umbrella branding less attractive. If r is not su¢ ciently high so that a large 1 can o¤set this
expected loss,17 then rms with two bad products no longer want to umbrella brand. Finally,
for su¢ ciently large b, umbrella branding is more protable again, since two successes become
a likely scenario. Moreover, as b approaches g, failures induce less and less updating.
For rms with one good and one bad product, on the other hand, umbrella branding is
unprotable if the bad product is likely to fail, i.e. b is small. As explained above, the negative
feedback e¤ect of a failure of the bad product would lead to a prot loss in the second period.
For small b, this second period e¤ect is so strong that even if umbrella branding increases prots
in the rst period, it may still lower the total expected prots for rms with one good and one
bad product. As b rises however, umbrella branding becomes more and more protable for any
given r. Conversely, for any given b, umbrella branding is protable only if r is su¢ ciently large.
Equilibria with perfect correlation then exist for b and g in the highlighted area that lies above
the indi¤erence curve dened by (b; b) = 0 but below the lower envelope of the indi¤erence
curves corresponding to (b; g) = 0 and (g; b) = 0.
Figure 1b) depicts the same indi¤erence curves, except that the value of b is now xed at
0:1 while g varies. For any (qo; qn), umbrella branding is again protable if and only if r lies
above the indi¤erence curve dened by (qo; qn) = 0 . Thus, perfect correlation equilibria only
exist if g is su¢ ciently large in this example. This suggests that the focus on the case where g
is close to 1 is justied. Figure 1c) shows for which combinations of b and  perfect correlation
equilibria exist: as expected in the light of the discussion about market symmetry in section
4.1, equilibria only exist for  in an intermediate range. In gure 1d), umbrella branding is
protable for the type (qo; qn)-type if and only if r lies below the indi¤erence curve dened by
(qo; qn). The gure shows that ceteris paribus equilibria only exist for  in an intermediate
range, as required in condition (iii) of proposition 4.
17 In this example, the rst period prot di¤erence 1 is increasing in r, but this need not always be the case.
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Figure 1: Pure Strategy Equilibria with Perfect Quality Correlation
5.1.3 Mixed Strategy Equilibria with Perfect Quality Correlation
For g su¢ ciently close to 1, there may also exist mixed strategy equilibria such that  = 1. In any
such equilibrium, xgg = 1 however. This is true because in the proof of proposition 4, I did not
rely on the purity of the equilibrium strategy to show either that 1 > 0 is a necessary condition
for an equilibrium with perfect correlation, or that 1 > 0 implies limg!1(g; g) > 0. Any
mixed equilibrium strategy must thus be of the form (1; 0; 0; xbb) where xbb 2 (0; 1). This result
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has a similar avor to the nding of Cabral (2000) that, under the assumption of exogenous
perfect quality correlation, umbrella branding incentives increase in quality.
The conditions under which a mixed strategy equilibrium of the form (1; 0; 0; xbb) indeed
exists are then the following. First, the necessary condition 1 > 0 is satised if and only if r
exceeds some lower bound that now depends not only on , , but also on xbb. If moreover b lies
below some upper bound that depends on r; ; , and xbb, then there exists a unique discount
factor such that (b; b) = 0 and all the other equilibrium conditions are satised.
Ceteris paribus, the decision to umbrella brand signals higher quality the lower xbb. This
implies that for any mixed strategy (1; 0; 0; xbb), the indi¤erence curves (qo; qn) = 0 must lie
below those depicted in gure 1a) for the pure strategy (1; 0; 0; 1). Moreover, mixed strategy
equilibria can only occur for (b; r) that lie on the indi¤erence curve(b; b) = 0. Therefore, even if
r < 0:6 in the numerical example, there can exist (mixed strategy) equilibria with perfect quality
correlation provided that b is su¢ ciently low. For r so high that no pure strategy equilibrium
exists, on the other hand, there cannot be any mixed strategy equilibrium either. Note also that
equilibria in which xbb is very small so that umbrella branding almost fully reveals high quality
only exist for very small r in the example analyzed here.
Finally, note that for some parameter values, there may also exist (pure and mixed strategy)
equilibria with imperfect positive quality corrlation.
5.2 Inexistence of Equilibria with Negative Quality Correlation
Whenever  < 0, successes (failures) have negative (positive) feedback e¤ects. This is clearly
counter-intuitive. Moreover, the available empirical evidence strongly indicates the opposite.
Erdem (1998) for example estimates a correlation coe¢ cient of 0:882 between the prior percep-
tions consumers have about the qualities of toothbrushes and toothpastes sold under umbrella
brands.18
To exclude equilibria with negative quality correlation, I rst rule out situations in which
the umbrella branded products are always of opposite qualities:
Proposition 5 There does not exist any equilibrium in which  =  1.
The inuition behind this result is the following. In the case of perfect negative correlation,
umbrella branding convinces consumers that one product is good and one product is bad, without
them knowing which product is the good one. If the rms indeed opt for an umbrella brand, the
success of product i then has a positive direct impact on consumersbelief about is quality that
is exactly equal to its negative feedback e¤ect on consumersbelief about product  i. Under
separate branding, on the other hand, successes have positive direct e¤ects but no negative
18See section 6.1 for more empirical evidence.
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feedback e¤ects. This implies that rms with two bad products have a higher incentive to
umbrella brand than either rms with a good old and a bad new product and/or rms with a
bad old and good new product.19 In other words, umbrella branding is particularly attractive for
rms with two bad products, since (i) the outside option of separate branding is less attractive for
the (b; b)-type than for any other type, and (ii) successes, which are more likely to be experienced
by rms with one good product, induce large negative feedback e¤ects under umbrella branding.
Therefore it seems impossible to keep rms with two bad products from umbrella branding
in any candidate equilibrium with negative quality correlation. I am able to show, however,
that for xbb too large (in particular for xbb = 1), there does not exist any equilibrium such that
 < 0 either. The reason is that signaling e¤ects clearly decrease in xbb; and it is impossible
to o¤set this stigmatization of umbrella brands by means of a high xgg without inducing a
positive quality correlation. If xbb  max[xgb; xbg], then the stigmatization becomes so strong
that umbrella branding would lower both rst and second period prices (after any history of
performances) and therefore be unprotable for all rms. Thus:
Lemma 2 There does not exist any equilibrium such that  < 0 and
xbb  max[xgb; xbg]:
Lemma 2 implies that xbb < 1 is a necessary condition for an equilibrium with negative
quality correlation. Since by lemma 1 the expected price impacts of the feedback e¤ects are
positive if both products are bad and  < 0, this requires that at least one of the signaling
e¤ects must be negative in equilibrium, otherwise (b; b) > 0. For at least one of the signaling
e¤ects to be negative in turn, xgg must not be too large:
Lemma 3 There does not exist any equilibrium such that  < 0 and
xgg  min

xbg   1  

(xgb   xbb) ; xgb   1  r
r
(xbg   xbb)

:
Lemma 3 implies that there cannot be any equilibrium in which xgg = 1: by lemma 2,
xbb < max[xgb; xbg] is a necessary condition for an equilibrium with negative correlation, which
implies that the threshold of xgg in lemma 3 cannot exceed 1. The following corollary therefore
follows directly from proposition 5, lemma 2 and lemma 3:
Corollary 1 There does not exist any pure strategy equilibrium in which  < 0.
These analytical results leave open the possibility that, for some parameter values, there
may exist mixed strategy equilibria with negative quality correlation in which xbb 2 (0; 1). On
19The relative importance of the di¤erent products, i.e. , determines whether (b; b) > (g; b) or (b; b) >
(b; g) or both. For  = 1
2
, both inequalities hold.
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the basis of numerical simulations, however, I am condent that such mixed strategy equilibria
do not exist either.
6 Extension: Endogenous Choice of the New Products Quality
This section considers a model extension that endogenizes the new products quality. The key
di¤erence with respect to the previous setup is that before launching the new product, the
innovator must decide whether to make a one-time investment to ensure that qn = g; absent the
investment, qn = b. The cost c of the quality-improving investment is a random draw from the
uniform distribution with support [0;  (g   b)], where the upper bound,  (g   b), is chosen so
as to equal the prot (and welfare) gain from investment under symmetric information.
The timing is such that the innovator20 nds out whether umbrella branding with the incum-
bents product is feasible or not before the investment decision stage.In case umbrella branding
is an option, the innovator and the incumbent make the investment and branding decisions si-
multaneously so as to maximize expected aggregate prots, given qo and the realized investment
cost c, both known to both rms.21 If umbrella branding is not an option, then the innovator
makes the investment decision so as to maximize the expected prot from selling the new prod-
uct only. Consumers cannot observe investment decision and product qualities, but are aware
of the distribution of the investment cost.
In this more complex game, a strategy consists of (i) an investment decision rule, as a function
of the cost realization c, in case the innovator remains unmatched, and (ii) a rule determining
both the investment and the umbrella branding decision, as a function of c and qo, in case of a
match. A (Bayesian) equilibrium is again a situation in which the strategy maximizes expected
aggregate prots, and consumer beliefs are Bayesian consistent with the strategy.
Since the investment cost is random, any strategy induces three investment probabilities:
one for an innovator that is not matched with an incumbent, one for an innovator matched with
an incumbent of quality qo = g, and one for an innovator matched with an incumbent of quality
qo = b. I will denote these probabilities by i, ig, and ib, respectively. As before, perfect positive
quality correlation means that gg; bb > 0 while gb = bg = 0, where these beliefs now depend
on the anticipated joint investment/branding decision.
Proposition 6 Suppose an equilibrium in which umbrella branding signals perfect quality cor-
20Along the lines of the remark concluding section 2, the model could again be reinterpreted as one where a
single rm with two products makes both decisions.
21Results would remain unchanged if the matched rms made the investment decision prior to the umbrella
branding decision.
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relation exists. Then,
ib  i  ig;
and 0 < i < 1 in this equilibrium.
Proposition 6 shows that in any equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation, if it
exists, having the option to use an umbrella brand a¤ects the optimal investment decision.
In particular, the umbrella branding option introduces a tendency to align the new products
quality to that of the existing product. In fact, ib < i whenever rms with qo = b that do
not invest strictly prefer separate branding. Similarly, i < ig whenever rms with a good old
product that invest strictly prefer umbrella branding.
The intuition is straightforward. Treating perfect quality correlation as a given, rms with
the option to umbrella brand have to decide between (i) selecting quality qn = qo and umbrella
branding, or (ii) qn 6= qo and separate branding. Moroever, in equilibrium the branding decision
has to remain optimal when the (simultaneous) investment decision is taken as given.22 Firm(s)
that can umbrella brand a good old product then have a higher investment incentive than a
stand-along innovator, because umbrella branding increases the value of the investment beyond
what a stand-along innovator could expect. For rms with a bad old product, the situation is
exactly the reverse: the option to umbrella brand, chosen only if the investment is not made,
increases the expected relative value of having two bad products.
Given the existence result for equilibria with perfect quality correlation in the baseline model
(see proposition 4), it is not suprising that in the extended model there exist parameter values
for which perfect quality correlation arises in equibrium; in particular, this is again the case if
failures are su¢ ciently strong indications of low quality, i.e., for g close enough to 1. Consider
the following example:
Numerical Example For the parameter values r = 0:65,  =  = 0:5, g = 0:999999, and
b = 0:2, there exists a (Bayesian) equilibrium, in which the rmsstrategy is as follows:
 If qo = g, then invest in the quality of the new product and umbrella brand if c < bcg ' 0:27;
otherwise, do not invest and sell under separate brands.
 If qo = b, then invest in the quality of the new product and sell under separate brands if
c < bcb ' 0:14; otherwise, do not invest and sell under an umbrella brand.
 If you do not have the option to umbrella brand, then invest in the quality of the new
product if c < bc ' 0:15.
22 If, given the investment decision, rms had an incentive to opt for a di¤erent branding decision ex post, then
their (joint investment and branding) strategy would clearly not be optimal ex ante.
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The corresponding equilibrium investment probabilities are ig ' 0:68, i ' 0:37, and ib ' 0:35.
In expectation, rms that have an umbrella branding option invest more often than stand-alone
rms:
rig + (1  r) ib ' 0:56 > i ' 0:37:
Finally, for these parameter values, this is not only the unique pure strategy equilibrium with
 = 1, but also the only pure strategy equilibrium tout court.
7 Discussion
7.1 Comparison with Alternative Theories of Umbrella Branding
It is useful to compare the proposed model to alternative theories of umbrella branding in order
to explain the roles played by di¤erent assumptions, and to argue for what kinds of products
my approach seems most appropriate.
Wernerfelt (1988) was the rst to show that umbrella branding can serve as a perfect signal of
product quality. He assumes (i) that umbrella branding is more costly than separate branding,
and (ii) that failures are perfect signals of low quality. His main result is that under some
conditions the unique equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987)
is such that a rm uses an umbrella brand if and only if all products are of high quality. Using
the same two assumptions, Hakenes and Peitz (2008) analyze a game where a monopolist selects
not only the branding strategy but also both productsqualities before consumers make any
purchases. They nd that both equilibria with positive and with negative quality correlation
may exist.23 Applying a forward induction argument, they argue however that the unique pure
strategy equilibrium is one where rms invest in the high quality of both products and use an
umbrella brand.24
My analysis highlights that if one of this literatures assumptions, namely that failures are
perfect indications of low quality, is weakened only slightly, then umbrella branding can no
longer fully reveal high quality (proposition 2). Umbrella branding can signal positive quality
correlation however. The empirical literature conrms this prediction. In an empirical study of
the branding of toothpaste and toothbrushes based on scanner data, Erdem (1998) nds that (i)
consumers indeed remain uncertain about quality (here, the cavity-ghting ability) even after
repeated consumption, and (ii) "...though consumers perceive quality levels of umbrella brands as
correlated across product categories, which makes it easier for strong umbrella brands to introduce
23This result applies to the basic model in which products are symmetric. In the asymmetric case, the authors
restrict attention to equilibria with non-negative correlation.
24Hakenes and Peitz (2008) also show that applying Pareto-dominance as an equilibrium selection criterion
would lead to the same result, even if umbrella branding is cost neutral.
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new products, umbrella branding is not a guarantee for successful extensions". A key contribution
of my analysis to the existing literature is hence to move the emphasis from guaranteeing high
quality to signaling positive quality correlation. Moreover, I show that whenever umbrella
branding signals positive quality correlation, rms that already sell high quality products have
higher inventives to invest in new productsquality than rms without any existing products,
and - to an even larger extent - than rms that already sell low quality products.
To rene the equilibrium, and thus justify the focus on situations in which unbrella brands
reveal high quality, Wernerfelt (1988) relies on the assumption that umbrella branding is costly.
The motivation for this assumption is that umbrella brands may "confuse" consumers by dilut-
ing the brands identity in the product space.25 While this argument is probably relevant for
products that consumers strongly identify with their category (such as Tempo handkerchiefs in
Germany), there are also a number of reasons to believe that - absent signaling considerations -
umbrella branding may be less costly than the introduction of a new brand. First of all, I would
expect "direct" development costs (for package design etc.) to be lower for umbrella branded
products. Second, as Pepall and Richards (2002) argue, extensions may also be a way to fully ex-
ploit a brands intrinsic value, e.g., the status it confers to consumers. Consumers may then buy
branded products even if they expect these to be of relatively low quality. Grossman and Shapiro
(1988) point out that this explains why consumers are willing to pay for counterfeited Gucci or
Louis Vuitton bags. Third, if rms must invest in advertising simply to make consumers aware
of the existence of a new brand, an issue ignored in my analytical model, then there are clearly
high costs associated with separate branding. These points suggest that umbrella branding may
well be equally or even less costly than the use of separate brands. In a recent book addressed
to managers, Aaker (2004, p.213/214) even states that "The development of a new brand (or the
continued support of an existing separate brand) is expensive and di¢ cult. ...Thus, a separate
brand should be developed or supported only when a compelling need can be demonstrated.".
Cabral (2000) considers a (continuous) model in which umbrella branding is cost neutral,
and performances are always imperfect signals of quality, as in my analysis; however, he assumes
exogenous (perfect) quality correlation. The structure of his model is also simpler: consumers
only buy the extension product at t = 1, and only the core product at t = 2.26 Therefore,
umbrella branding has at most three di¤erent e¤ects: a signaling e¤ect on the new product
(called "direct reputation e¤ect" by Cabral), a "signaling e¤ect" on the old product, and a
feedback e¤ect on the core product (called "feedback reputation e¤ect").
It is easy to see why there could not be any (pure strategy) equilibrium with endogenous
25See for example Loken & John (1993).
26Wernerfelts (1988) model has the same structure. In Hakenes & Peitz (2004), on the other hand, consumers
buy both products in each period.
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quality correlation in the game considered by Cabral. First, if consumers do not buy the exten-
sion product at t = 2, then the magnitude of the price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new
product does not depend on qn. Second, if consumers do not buy the core product at t = 1,
neither the prot impact of the signaling e¤ect on the core product nor that of the feedback
e¤ect on the core product depend on qo. For any strategy such that  > 0, this implies that
(g; g) = (b; g) > (g; b) = (b; b), which directly leads to a contradiction in the case of pure
strategies.27 To endogenize quality correlation, I therefore need to extend Cabrals set-up.
Choi (1998) analyzes an innitely repeated game in which in every period a monopolist
discovers a new product that is of either high or low quality, and then introduces this product
under either a premium or a no-name brand. Choi shows that there may exist an equilibrium in
which the premium brand consistently provides high quality, assuming that a single consumption
allows consumers to perfectly learn a goods quality.
Like Choi, I consider a monopolists decision to assign products to brands. Whereas Choi
relies on coordination in an innitely repeated game to sustain consistent brands, I however
show that even in a nite horizon game umbrella brands may provide uniform quality. I believe
that my analysis is more pertinent in the context of goods for which consumers remain - at least
to some degree - uncertain about product quality even after repeated consumption. The reason
is that with imperfect monitoring the bootstrap mechanism used by Choi would require a high
degree of coordination between consumers and the rm. In particular, consumer trust would
have to break down temporarily if the incumbent is unlucky and a high quality product sold
under the premium brand fails.28
Hence, my theory seems to be more appropriate for products in categories where quality is
di¢ cult to evaluate for consumers, such as high-tech products, some food categories or drugs.
The example of dental care products (toothpaste and toothbrushes) analyzed empirically by
Erdem (1998) also falls into this group. Chois theory, on the other hand, seems more appropriate
for pure taste productssuch as Classic Coke which was extended to Diet Coke and Cherry Coke
among others. Finally, neither theory describes brand extensions in industries such as fashion,
cosmetics, and accessories, in a satisfactory way. The analysis of branding strategies in such
markets, where consumption decision may derive from the desire to belong to a certain group
or di¤erentiate yourself from other groups, remains an interesting topic for future research.
27This reasoning easily extends to the case where quality is a continuous variable.
28Alternatively, trust would need to break down for ever with some probability. Whereas such relatively complex
punishments seem appropriate in models of collusion between a small number of rms, it is more di¢ cult to imagine
the play of such equilibria when there is a large number of anonymous and possibly short-lived consumers.
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7.2 Empirical Evidence
The available evidence strongly supports the prediction that consumersperceptions of the qual-
ities of di¤erent products sold under the same umbrella brand are positively correlated. Aaker
and Keller (1990) provide experimental evidence that the perceived quality of a branded product
positively a¤ects the expected quality of hypothetical brand extensions. Erdem (1998) estimates
a structural model of umbrella branding on scanner panel data about toothpaste and toothbrush
purchases. The dataset comprises information about both a number of umbrella branded prod-
ucts and products sold under separate brands. The underlying structural model is similar to
the one I propose: consumers have prior beliefs about individual productsqualities, which they
update over time as they accumulate experience. Erdem estimates a correlation between prior
quality perceptions, corresponding to my parameter , of 0:882.
If quality correlation is indeed positive, then umbrella branding may help rms with high
reputation products to successfully introduce new products. Indeed, there is plenty of empirical
evidence showing that products introduced as brand extensions are on average more successful
than newly branded products.29 In a recent study based on survey data about a large range of
consumer products, Smith and Park (1992) conrm that umbrella branding contributes favorably
to market share and advertising e¢ ciency. However, "revenue and advertising cost di¤erentials
diminish considerably after a products introductory period"; thus, umbrella branding helps ini-
tially thanks to signaling e¤ects, but as consumers accumulate information over time, branding
loses importance. Moreover, they nd that "the brand extension-new brand di¤erential in the
revenue component of cash ow widens as brand strength increases". Interpreting brand strength
as the reputation r of the core product,30 this nding is consistent with the model proposed here:
as can be easily checked, the signaling e¤ect on the extension product, i.e. n   , increases in
r in any equilibrium characterized by positive quality correlation.31
In some cases the decision to umbrella brand was also found to have a positive e¤ect on
the consumerswillingness to pay for the old product. Sullivan (1990) shows that when in 1988
Jaguar launched its rst new model in 17 years, the old Jaguar models experienced signicant
increases in demand. Furthermore, Balachander and Ghoses (2003) analysis of scanner panel
data suggests that the advertising of brand extensions produces signicant reciprocal spillover
e¤ects on core products. This is consistent with my model, which predicts that umbrella brand-
ing has a positive signaling e¤ect on the extension and/or the core product in any equilibrium
29See for example Claycamp & Liddy (1969) for an early reference.
30 In Smith and Park (1992), consumers are asked to evaluate the strength of the brand as a whole, rather than
of individual products.
31The same holds in the extended model in section 6. There, (n   i) is increasing in r in any equilibrium with
perfect positive quality correlation.
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with positive quality correlation.
Another important feature of equilibria with positive quality correlation is that the success
(failure) of any one of the products has a positive (negative) feedback e¤ect on the other product
sold under the same umbrella brand. Sullivan (1990) provides an example of the negative
feedbacks e¤ects failures can have. She shows that the alleged sudden-acceleration defect of the
Audi 5000 model resulted in a signicant demand drop for the Audi 4000 model. Conversely,
the success of Apple iPods in recent years seems to considerably boost the demand for Apple
computers. The Economist (January 12th, 2006) even states that "the halo e¤ect from the
iPod remains Apples most e¤ective means of boosting sales of its computers...In 2005 the iPod
helped the company to increase its share of the personal computer market from 3% to 4%."
My analysis shows that if consumers have very optimistic or pessimistic prior beliefs about
one of the products, then umbrella branding cannot credibly signal quality correlation (see
proposition 1). Smith and Park (1992) nd that the e¤ect of brand extensions (on market share
and advertising e¢ ciency) is smaller when consumersknowledge of the extension product is
high than when it is low. Since well-informed consumers have priors close to either 0 or 1, this
is consistent with my result.
A testable prediction of my analysis is that the successful leveraging of reputation from one
product to another is more di¢ cult if markets are very asymmetric (see proposition 1). This
would be the case for example if a brand used for products of mass consumption were extended
to a niche category. I am not aware of any existing empirical study addressing this issue. My
analysis also underlines the importance of repeated future consumption of both products for
the successful signaling of quality correlation (see the discussion in section 7.1 and point 3. of
proposition 1). This suggests that extensions can only be successful if both the core and the
extension product are expected to survive for a su¢ ciently long time.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let i 6=  i 2 fo; ng. First note that since prices are linear in beliefs,
E
h
w

i(
i
 i)

  w  i(i) j qo; qni> 0
is equivalent to
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i(
i) j qo; qn
i
> 0 .
As explained in section 3.1, i(
i) is the probability consumers would assign to product i being
good given only the following two pieces of information: rst, the fact that product i is umbrella branded,
and second, its performance i:
i(
i) =Pr fqi= g j i, umbrella brandingg :
The belief i(
i
 i) is the probability consumers assign to product i being good given not only i and
the observation of an umbrella brand but also  i:
i(
i
 i) =Pr fqi= g j i, i, umbrella brandingg :
Since  i2fS; Fg, the following equality then directly follows from Bayesrule:
i(
i) = Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandinggi(iS) (10)
+(1 Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandingg )i(
i
F ):
As the belief that a product is good is a probability, any conditional probability assigned to a products
success must trivially lie between b and g. Therefore:32
Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandingg2 (b; g) : (11)
Now consider the case q i= g. Since g >Pr f i= S j i, umbrella brandingg, it is a straightfor-
ward implication of the equality in (10) that for any i2fS; Fg:
gi(
i
S) + (1  g)i(
i
F ) > i(
i) if and only if i(
i
S) > i(
i
F ). (12)
As i() is strictly increasing, i(iS) > i(
i
F ) if and only if 
i
S> 
i
F , which is the case whenever
successes have positive feedback e¤ects, i.e. for  > 0.
The total "expected feedback e¤ect" can be decomposed as follows:
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i(
 i) j qo; qn
i
= qi
h
q iS(iS) + (1  q i)S(iF )  S(i)
i
+(1  qi)
h
q iF (iS) + (1  q i)F (iF )  F (i)
i
:
32The strict inclusion in the set (b; g) follows from the simple fact that  6= 0 is incompatible with umbrella
branding fully revealing the quality of one (or both) of the products to consumers.
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The nding in (12) directly implies that if quality correlation is positive, so that iS> 
i
F , then both
terms between square brackets are positive. Hence, if  > 0, then
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i(
 i) j qi; q i= g
i
> 0: (13)
If quality correlation is negative on the other hand, so that iS< 
i
F , then
E
h
i(
i
 i)  i( i) j qi; q i = g
i
< 0: (14)
Conversely, (10) and (11) imply that for q i= b the inequalities in (13) and (14) are reversed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: I rst show that babbling equilibria always exist. Suppose that the
equilibrium branding strategy is such that xgg = xgb = xbg = xbb > 0. Then, the branding decision
does not have any signaling e¤ects, i.e. o = r and n = . Moreover,  = 0 and umbrella branding
does not induce any feedback e¤ects either. Consequently, prices are una¤ected by the branding decision,
so that (qo; qn) = 0 for any (qo; qn). The branding strategy is therefore optimal.
I now show that if one of conditions 1. to 4. of proposition 1 is satised, then any equilibrium must
be a babbling equilibrium:
1. First consider the limit case  = 0, in which the decision to umbrella brand is fully driven by
its impact on the expected prots made from selling the core product. This expected prot impact can
be decomposed into two terms corresponding to the signaling e¤ect and the feedback e¤ects on the old
product, respectively. Moreover, the sign of the signaling e¤ect is independent of qualities. The sign of
the expected impact of the feedback e¤ect on the old product depends on the quality of the new product
however: by lemma 1, it is positive if and only if qn= g. Now consider any candidate equilibrium such
that  > 0. First, it is easy to see that the signaling e¤ect must be positive in any such equilibrium. If it
were negative, then for rms with a bad new product umbrella branding would reduce prots, since both
signaling and feedback e¤ects would reduce expected prots. If xgb= xbb= 0 however, then umbrella
branding does not signal any quality correlation. Therefore suppose that the signaling e¤ect is positive.
In that case, both signaling and feedback e¤ects increase expected prots for rms with a good new
product. This implies that xgg= xbg= 1 in any such equilibrium. For the signaling e¤ect to be indeed
positive, it must then be that xgb> xbb. This leads to a contradiction of the initial assumption  > 0,
since - given that good new products are always umbrella branded - positive correlation would require
that bad new products are more likely to be under an umbrella brand with other bad rather than good
products.
Hence, for  = 0, there does not exist any equilibrium such that  > 0. Using the same approach, I
can rule out all equilibria such that  6= 0 for  = 1 or  = 0. Since prots are smooth in , it follows
from these results that equilibria with feedback e¤ects do not exist for  "too" close to 0 or 1 either.
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Non-babblingequilibria such that  = 0 are also impossible. Since there are no feedback e¤ects for
 = 0, whether rms want to umbrella brand or not will only depend on the signaling e¤ect on one of
the products, the sign of which is independent of qualities.
2. If consumersprior about one of the products is already perfectly accurate, then umbrella branding
induces no feedback e¤ects. Suppose, for example, that r = 1. Then, the new products performance
cannot have any feedback e¤ect on the old product under umbrella branding, since consumers remain
convinced that the old product is good no matter what happens. Similarly, as the old products perfor-
mance has no direct e¤ect on the belief about the old product itself, it cannot have any feedback e¤ect
on the new product either: n= nS= 
n
F
 
= gg

. Umbrella branding has no signaling e¤ect on the
old product either, since consumers are already convinced of its quality. Branding incentives are hence
driven by the signaling e¤ect on the new product. The branding incentives of di¤erent types (qo; qn) are
thus fully aligned, and umbrella branding cannot credibly signal any quality information. As prots are
smooth in r, it follows that for any strategy and values of the other parameters, there exists a threshold
of r above which the performance of the old product does not a¤ect beliefs su¢ ciently for a non-babbling
equilibrium to exist. I can use the same line of reasoning to rule out non-babblingequilibria for r close
to 0, or  close to 1 or to 0.
3. If the weight attached to future prots approaches 0, then short term signaling e¤ects completely
drive the rms decision to umbrella brand or not:
lim
!0
(qo; qn) = 1.
In the limit, the incentives to umbrella brand are hence completely independent of qualities. By continuity,
this implies that for  su¢ ciently close to 0, only babbling equilibria can exist.33
4. If b were equal to g, then performance would no longer yield any information about quality to
consumers. Formally, this would mean that for any initial belief , S() = F () =  . Hence,
lim
b!g
(qo; qn) = 1;
which is independent of (qo; qn). It then follows from continuity that for b su¢ ciently close to g, only
babblingequilibria can exist.
Q.E.D.
33Whenever 1 6= 0, the umbrella branding incentives of the di¤erent types of the incumbent are
completely aligned for all  below some strictly positive threshold. There may not exist any such strictly
positive threshold of  if 1 = 0 and one signaling e¤ect is strictly positive, however. This case is
neglected here because generically it does not occur.
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Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose (in negation) that there is an equilibrium in which only rms
with good old products extend their brands, i.e. xbg= xbb= 0; but xgg> 0 and/or xgb> 0. Since even
good products can fail (i.e., g < 1), consumers then believe that the old product is good with probability
1 in both periods. Moreover, as qo is fully revealed, the old products performance does not have any
feedback e¤ect on the new product. Aggregate prots under umbrella branding are therefore independent
of the old products true quality.
For any given qn, if there is a di¤erence between (g; qn) and (b; qn), then this must be due to
a prots di¤erence under separate branding. Since prots under separate branding are always lower the
higher the number of bad products however, for any qn2 fb; gg:
(b; qn) > (g; qn):
This implies, however, that xbg xgg and xbb xgb, which contradicts the initial assumption. By the
same reasoning, it is easy to rule out equilibria in which umbrella branding fully reveals the new products
quality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: I rst show that the four conditions xgg= 0, min [xgb; xbg] = 0, and
max [xgb; xbg] > 0 must be satised in any non-babbling equilibrium such that  = 0.
First, suppose (in negation) that xgg> 0. Then, whenever xbb= 0, and the equilibrium strategy is
such that  = 0, umbrella branding certies the quality of at least one of the products. By proposition
2, this is impossible. If xbb> 0, on the other hand, then for  = 0 to be true, it must be that xqoqn> 0
for all (qo; qn). However, as is easy to see, this is only possible in a babbling equilibrium.
Second, suppose that min [xgb; xbg] > 0. Then, the necessary condition xgg= 0 implies that  < 0,
a contradiction.
Third, suppose that max [xgb; xbg] = 0. Then, since it must also be that xgg= 0, umbrella branding
certies the bad quality of both products (I ignore situations in which umbrella branding never happens
on the equilibrium path). Therefore, umbrella branding is clearly unprotable for all rms.
I hence know that it must be that xgg= 0, min [xgb; xbg] = 0 and max [xgb; xbg] > 0 in any non-
babbling equilibrium such that  = 0. Umbrella branding thus certies the bad quality of either the old
or the new product. If xbb were equal to 0, then umbrella branding would at the same time certify the
high quality of the other product, which is impossible by proposition 2. Hence, it must be that xbb> 0.
For xbb> 0 to be optimal, it must be that (b; b)  0. Since umbrella branding does not lead to
any feedback e¤ects here, at least one of the signaling e¤ects must then be positive, otherwise umbrella
branding would never be protable. Given that xgg=min [xgb; xbg] = 0, at least one of the signaling
e¤ects is positive if and only if xbb<max [xgb; xbg]. Hence, xbb<max [xgb; xbg] is a necessary equilibrium
condition.
To show that there indeed exist equilibria of the form xgg= 0,min [xgb; xbg] = 0,max [xgb; xbg] > 0,
and xbb2 (0;max[xgb; xbg]), I provide a numerical example. Consider the mixed strategy (0; 0; 1; 0:1).
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Then, for  = 0:4, g = 0:98, b = 0:4,  =  = 0:5, and r =br' 0:423, this mixed strategy is indeed opti-
mal since (gg) '  0:154 < 0, (gb) '  0:208 < 0, (gb) ' 0:0544 > 0, and (bb) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof will proceed as follows. First I show that in the limit
case g = 1 (while all other parameters remain strictly between 0 and 1), a pure strategy equilibrium
such that  = 1 exists if and only if 1> 0, b  b(r; ; ), and (r; ; ; b)   (r; ; ; b), where
b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1), (r; ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and (r; ; ; b) 2 [(); 1). Since prots are smooth in g, the
statement made in the proposition will follow from this result.
Suppose the incumbent plays the strategy
 
xgg; xgb; xbg; xbb

= (1; 0; 0; 1) in equilibrium. Then,
o= n, oS= 
n
S , and 
o
F= 
n
F . To simplify notations, I dene   o= n, S oS= nS , and
F oF= nF .
It is straightforward that, if good products never fail (i.e. if g = 1), then a single failure su¢ ces to
convince consumers of bad quality:
lim
g!1
F (e) = 0 for any e2 [0; 1).
Moreover, since consumers expect umbrella brands to always sell products of uniform quality, the failure
of a single umbrella branded product su¢ ces to convince consumers that both products are bad:
lim
g!1
F= 0.
Hence, under an umbrella brand, the willingness to pay in period 2 is zero whenever (at least) one of the
products fails in period 1:
lim
g!1
F (S) = limg!1
S(F ) = limg!1
F (F ) = 0.
These observations, and the linearity of w(), imply that
lim
g!1
2(S; S)= (1  b)
0@ (1  ) [limg!1 S(S)  limg!1 S(r)]
+ [limg!1 S(S)  limg!1 S()]
1A ; (15)
lim
g!1
2(S; F )= (1  b)(1  )

  lim
g!1
S(r)

< 0; (16)
lim
g!1
2(F; S)= (1  b)

  lim
g!1
S()

< 0; (17)
lim
g!1
2(F; F )= 0: (18)
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The expected marginal impacts of umbrella branding on second period prots are
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j g; g] = limg!12(SS); (19)
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j g; b] = b limg!12(SS) + (1  b) limg!12(SF ); (20)
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; g] = b limg!12(SS) + (1  b) limg!12(FS); (21)
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; b] = b

b lim
g!1
2(SS) + (1  b) lim
g!1
2(SF )

(22)
+(1  b)

b lim
g!1
2(FS) + (1  b) lim
g!1
2(FF )

:
An equilibrium with perfect quality correlation then exists if and only if the following four inequalities
are satised, so that the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1) is indeed optimal:
lim
g!1
(g; g) = (1  )1+ limg!1E [2(o; n) j g; g] 0; (23)
lim
g!1
(g; b) = (1  )1 +  lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j g; b] 0; (24)
lim
g!1
(b; g) = (1  )1 +  lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; g] 0; (25)
lim
g!1
(b; b) = (1  )1 +  lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; b] 0: (26)
To derive su¢ cient conditions under which (23) to (26) are indeed satised, I prove the following ve
statements step by step:
Step 1 In equilibrium, it must be that limg!1E [2(o; n) j b; b]< 0 and 1> 0.
Step 2 If 1> 0, then equilibrium condition (23) is satised.
Step 3 If 1> 0, then there exists a threshold b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
lim
g!1
(b; b) >max

lim
g!1
(g; b); lim
g!1
(b; g)

if and only if b <b(r; ; ).
Step 4 If1> 0 and b <b(r; ; ), then there exist thresholds (r; ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and (r; ; ; b) 2 [(); 1)
such that the equilibrium conditions (24), (25) and (26) are simultaneously satised if and only if
 2 [(r; ; ; b); (r; ; ; b)].
Step 1: For any qo2 fb; gg, E[2(o; n) j qo; b] is equal to the following weighted sum:
E[2(o; n) j qo; b] = qoE [2(S; n) j qn= b] +(1  qo)E [2(F; n) j qn= b] : (27)
In any equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation, umbrella branding must be more protable
for rms with two bad products than for rms with a good old and bad new product. Clearly, for this to
be true, it must be that
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E [2(S; n) j qn= b] E [2(F; n) j qn= b] : (28)
Now consider the limit case g = 1. Since
lim
g!1
E [2(F; n) j qn= b] = b limg!12(FS)| {z }
<0
+(1  b) lim
g!1
2(FF )| {z }
=0
< 0,
(28) implies that for any qo, all terms in limg!1E [2(o; n) j qo; b] are negative. Hence,
lim
g!1
E [2(o; n) j b; b]< 0.
For (b; b)-rms to be willing to use umbrella brands nevertheless, i.e. for equilibrium condition (26)
to hold for some discount factors, it is then necessary that
1> 0;
which here is equivalent to the condition
 =
r
r + (1  r)(1  )> (1  )r + : (29)
Step 2: Given the strategy (1; 0; 0; 1),
2(S; S) = w (S(S)) (1  )w (S(r)) w (S()) ;
which can be rewritten as
2(S; S)
(g   b) = [S(S)  S()]+ [S()  S ((1  ) r + )]
+ [S ((1  ) r + ) (1  )S(r)  S()] :
The rst of the terms in this expression is positive because  > 0 implies that S> . The last term is
positive because S() is a concave function. Finally, the second term is positive whenever 1> 0 (see
(29)). Hence, if 1> 0 then 2(S; S) > 0.
In the limit case g = 1, rms with two good products are certain to experience two successes. Hence,
whenever 1> 0, then also
lim
g!1
(g; g) = (1  )1+ limg!12(S; S)| {z }
>0
> 0;
i.e. equilibrium condition (23) is satised.
Step 3: I now show that there exists a threshold b(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
lim
g!1
(b; b) >max

lim
g!1
(g; b); lim
g!1
(b; g)

(30)
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if and only if b <b(r; ; ). First, limg!1(b; b) > limg!1(g; b) if and only if
lim
g!1
E[2(o; n) j b; b] > limg!1E[2(o; n) j g; b]; (31)
Substituting for the expected prot di¤erences and simplifying, this condition rewrites as
b lim
g!1
S(S) < (1  ) limg!1S(r);
which is equivalent to
b

+ (1  )b2< (1  )
r
r + (1  r)b ;
or
K(b)  b2 [(1  r)  (1  )r] +br  (1  )r < 0:
It is easy to see that K(0) < 0. Moreover, 1> 0 implies that K(1) > 0. Since K(b) describes a
parabola, there then exists a unique b1(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that K(b) < 0 if and only if b <b1(r; ; ).
Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that there exists a b2(r; ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
lim
g!1
E[2(o; n) j b; b] > limg!1E[2(o; n) j b; g] (32)
if and only if b <b2(r; ; ). Dening
b(r; ; ) min b1(r; ; ); b2(r; ; ) ;
it follows that condition (30) is satised if and only if b <b(r; ; ).
Step 4: Steps 1 and 3 establish that if b <b(r; ; ), then
max [E [2(o; n) j g; b] ; E [2(o; n) j g; b]]<E [2(o; n) j b; b]< 0:
It is straightforward to see that if these inequalities hold and moreover 1 > 0, then there exists a non-
empty range

(r; ; ; b);(r; ; ; b)
2 (0; 1) such that the equilibrium conditions (24), (25) and (26)
are simultaneously satised for any  2 (r; ; ; b);(r; ; ; b).34 Moreover, for  2  (r; ; ; b);(r; ; ; b),
the three equilibrium conditions (24), (25) and (26) are satised with strict inequalities.
To conclude note that, as long as r; ; b;  2 (0; 1),35 the equilibrium prots from selling each of the
products are smooth in g. The statement made in proposition 1 then directly follows from the results
established in steps 1 to 4. Q.E.D.
34 It is obvious that the range of  for which an equilibrium exists is always included in (0; 1) here: since
 is the share of prots accruing to the second period, limg!1(qo; qn) can achieve any value between
limg!12(qo; qn) and 1 by letting  vary between 1 and 0.
35 If r were equal to 1, for example, then beliefs may not be smooth: While for g = 1, it would not be
clear what beliefs consumers should hold following a failure (of either one of the products), for g almost
equal to 1, they would always continue to believe that both products are good (even after observing two
failures).
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Proof of Proposition 5: The correlation coe¢ cient  is equal to  1 whenever xgg= xbb= 0
but xgb; xbg> 0. Such a strategy indeed maximizes aggregate prots if (b; g);(g; b)  0 but
(g; g); (b; b)  0. Hence, the following two conditions must hold in any equilibrium with perfect
negative quality correlation:
(g; b) (b; b); (33)
(b; g) (b; b): (34)
Since the rst period impact of umbrella branding is independent of (qo; qn), condition (33) is equivalent
to
E [2(o; n) j g; b] E [2(o; n) j b; b] ; (35)
Condition (35) is indeed satised, i.e. the (g; b)-type has higher incentives to umbrella brand than the
(b; b)-type, if and only if, given qn= b, the expected impact of a success of the old product on the prot
di¤erence between umbrella and separate branding is positive:
E [2(S; n) j qn= b] E [2(F; n) j qn= b] 0: (36)
I now show that this condition is always violated if  12 . First, note that, since prices are linear in
beliefs, condition (36) can be rewritten as follows:
0 b
264(1  ) [S(oS)  F (oS)]| {z }
>0 (direct e¤ect)
+ [S(
n
S)  S(nF )]| {z }
<0 (feedback e¤ect)
375 (37)
+(1  b)
264(1  ) [S(oF )  F (oF )]| {z }
>0 (direct e¤ect)
+ [F (
n
S)  F (nF )]| {z }
<0 (feedback e¤ect)
375
 (1  ) [S(r)  F (r)]| {z }
>0 (direct e¤ect under separate branding)
:
Both in the case of a success or of a failure of the new product, which occur with probabilities b and
(1  b) respectively, the success of the old product has two di¤erent e¤ects under umbrella branding: rst,
a positive direct e¤ect on the belief consumers hold about the old product itself, and second, a negative
feedback e¤ect on consumersbelief about the new product. Under separate branding, the success of the
old product only has a positive direct e¤ect, whose size is independent of the new products performance.
Next, note that in any equilibrium such that  =  1 consumers must be convinced that the umbrella
brand sells one bad and one good product. This means that for any realization of performances, the
probability consumers assign to the new product being good must be the "complement" of the probability
they assign to the old product being good. Formally, for any (o; n):
o(
o
n
) + n(
n
o
) = 1: (38)
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From this it follows that (given the new products performance) the positive (direct) e¤ect a success of
the old product has on the old product itself is exactly o¤set by its negative (feedback) e¤ect on the new
product: since for any n,
S(
o
n
) + n(
n
S) = 1 = F (
o
n
) + n(
n
F );
it is always true that 
S(
o
n
)  F (on)

=   n(nS)  n(nF ) : (39)
Substituting   S(on)  F (on) for n(nS)  n(nF ), I can then simplify condition (37) to
0  b(1  2) [S(oS)  F (oS)]| {z }
>0
+(1  b)(1  2) [S(oF )  F (oF )]| {z }
>0
(40)
 (1  ) [S(r)  F (r)]| {z }
>0
:
This condition is clearly violated for any  12 . First, if the rm attaches the same or more weight to the
prots made on the new product, the negative feedback e¤ect of a success of the old product outweighs
its positive direct e¤ect, hence the rst two terms in (40) are negative. Second, successes always increase
prots under separate branding, so that the last term in (40) is negative for any .
Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that for any  12 , rms with a bad old and a
good new product would prefer separate to umbrella branding, i.e. condition (34) would be violated.
I can conclude that the necessary conditions (33) and (34) are never simultaneously satised, and no
equilibrium such that  =  1 exists. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose that  < 0 in equilibrium. Then, oF> 
o> oS and 
n
F> 
n> nS .
In the following, I will show that oF< r if xbb xgb, and nF<  if xbb xbg. From this, it then follows
that for xbbmax [xgb; xbg] umbrella branding is unprotable, because it deteriorates the beliefs about
both products in all circumstances.
First consider
oF=
rxgg(1  g) + r(1  )xgb(1  b)h
rxgg+(1  r)xbg
i
(1  g)+
h
r(1  )xgb+(1  r)(1  )xbb
i
(1  b)
:
It is easy to check that the belief oF is increasing in xgg. For any xbb> 0, the correlation  is negative
if and only if
xgg<
xgbxbg
xbb
:
Hence,
oF<
r
xgbxbg
xbb
(1  g) + r(1  )xgb(1  b)h
r
xgbxbg
xbb
+(1  r)xbg
i
(1  g) +
h
r(1  )xgb+(1  r)(1  )xbb
i
(1  b)
;
41
which simplies to
oF <
xgbr

xbg(1  g) + r(1  )xbb(1  b)

xgbr

xbg(1  g) + r(1  )xbb(1  b)

+ xbb(1  r)

xbg(1  g) + r(1  )xbb(1  b)

=
xgbr
xgbr + xbb(1  r) :
If xbb xgb, then
xgbr
xgbr + xbb(1  r) r:
I can thus conclude that if  < 0 and xbb xgb, then
oF< r.
Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that if  < 0 and xbb xbg, then
nF< .
If  < 0, then it follows from these ndings that also oS ; 
o< r and nS ; 
n< . Therefore, 1< 0
and 2(o; n) < 0 for any (o; n), so that (qo; qn) < 0 for any (qo; qn), which contradicts  < 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: The condition xgg xbg 1  (xgb xbb) is equivalent to o r, and the
condition xgg xgb 1 rr (xbg xbb) is equivalent to n . Hence, if both conditions are satised, then
both signaling e¤ects are non-negative. Suppose that  < 0 in equilibrium. Then, by lemma 1, the total
impact of feedback e¤ects on expected prots is positive if both products are bad. Therefore, whenever
 < 0 and both signaling e¤ects are non-negative, (b; b) > 0. By lemma 2, however, there cannot be
any negative correlation equilibrium such that xbb= 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose that there exists at least one equilibrium that generates per-
fect positive quality correlation between umbrella branded products. In what follows, let me denote by
U (qo; qn) and 
S (qo; qn), respectively, expected aggregate prots gross of investment costs under um-
brella branding and under separate branding, given qo, and qn as determined by the investment decision.
In line with previous notations, use (qo; qn)= 
U (qo; qn) S (qo; qn). Note that in any equilibrium
with perfect quality correlation, it must be that (g; g) ;(b; b) 0 and (g; b) ;(b; g) 0: the
branding decision must be optimal for any given investment decision, otherwise the rms strategy (that
determines investment and branding jointly) could not be optimal in the rst place.
Consider now the investment decision, taking as given consumers beliefs and that the rms use
umbrella branding only in conjunction with investment decisions that induce uniform quality. Consider
an unmatched innovator rst. Investing in high quality is protable for this rm if and only if the expected
increase in second-period prots exceeds the investment cost, i.e., whenever
c  
   [w (S (i)) w (F (i))] :
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Given my distributional assumptions, in equilibrium the following condition implictly denes i :
i =
 [w (S (i)) w (F (i))]
g   b : (41)
Clearly, i = 1 cannot be a solution. i = 0 solves (41), but cannot arise in an equilibrium with  = 1
nonetheless. If i = 0, then (b; g)> (b; b): (i) since consumers consider an individually branded new
product to be bad no matter what, separate branding would give the same prot for the two quality
proles, but (ii) under umbrella branding the expected prot is evidently higher for the (b; g)-prole
than for the (b; b)-prole. Hence, whenever (b; g) 0, then (b; b)< 0, which violates a necessary
equilibrium condition. Therefore, in any equilibrium with  = 1, it must be that i 2 (0; 1).36
Next consider rms with an old product of quality qo= g. In any equilibrium with perfect quality
correlation, these rms will either invest and umbrella brand, or alternatively not invest and use separate
brands. Therefore, making the investment increases expected aggregate prots if and only if
S (g; b)  U (g; g) c
,
c  U (g; g) S (g; g)| {z }
=(g;g)
+S (g; g) S (g; b)| {z }
=

Since for  = 1 to arise it is necessary that (g; g) 0, we can conlude that ig i. Moreover, whenever
(g; g)> 0 (as is the case in such equilibria for g close to 1), then ig> i.
Now consider rms that have the option to umbrella brand the new product with an existing product
of low quality. In any equilibrium with  = 1, these rms will either not invest and umbrella brand, or
invest and opt for separate brands. Investing in the high quality if therefore protable if and only if
U (b; b)  S (b; g)  c
,
c    U (b; b)  S (b; b)| {z }
=(b;b)
+S (b; g)  S (b; b)| {z }
=

:
Since (b; b) 0 is a necessary condition for an equilibrium with  = 1, the right-hand side of this
expression lies (weakly) below 
. Hence, ib i. Q.E.D.
36A strictly positive solution of (41) indeed exists if  (g   b)2> (1  b) b, which is hence a necessary
condition for an equilibrium with perfect quality correlation here.
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